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DEBATE

OFF-LABEL DRUG PROMOTION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Oﬀ-label promotion—pharmaceutical manufacturers’ marketing of FDAapproved drugs for unapproved uses—is considered a First Amendment right by
some, a threat to the safety and eﬀectiveness of pharmaceutical drugs by others.
Although oﬀ-label prescription is legal and often beneﬁcial, the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and corresponding FDA regulations eﬀectively
prohibit oﬀ-label promotion. The FDA can look to statements by pharmaceutical
representatives as evidence of a drug’s intended use, thereby placing manufacturers
that promote oﬀ-label in a Catch-22: the drug will be subject to the FDCA’s
misbranding provisions if manufacturers add labeling instructions for that intended use, but also if they fail to add those instructions. To legally promote a new
intended use, pharmaceutical companies must satisfy the FDA’s rigorous approval process. In United States v. Caronia, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the FDCA could not be interpreted to prohibit truthful, oﬀ-label promotion.
Professors Stephanie Greene and Lars Noah debate the constitutionality of
the FDA’s prohibitions in light of Caronia and the Supreme Court’s increased
deference to commercial speakers’ First Amendment rights. Professor Greene
argues that Caronia was wrongly decided because the court failed to scrutinize
the nature of oﬀ-label promotion. Greene contends that the truthfulness of oﬀlabel information is “speculative, unknown, or inaccessible,” and that the FDA’s
restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion serve two substantial interests: ensuring that
both doctors and consumers receive accurate, scientiﬁcally based information,
and assuring that drugs have been proven safe and eﬀective. Professor Noah
questions Greene’s assumption that promotion of off-label drug uses is presumptively untruthful or misleading. He argues that Supreme Court precedent
cuts against Greene’s position, and that the FDA’s restrictions on oﬀ-label
promotion are unconstitutionally broad because they prevent drug manufacturers from disseminating even truthful and nonmisleading information, and because
the FDA could accomplish its goals through less-speech-restrictive means.
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O PENING STATEMENT
FDA Prohibitions on Oﬀ-Label Marketing Do Not Violate
Drug Manufacturers’ First Amendment Rights
STEPHANIE M. G REENE†
Pharmaceutical manufacturers maintain that truthful and nonmisleading
promotion of drugs for oﬀ-label uses is protected by the First Amendment
right to free speech and that regulations that restrict such speech are
unconstitutional. This argument ignores the very purpose of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which seeks to protect the public
by ensuring that pharmaceutical drugs are safe and eﬀective for their
intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2012). The truth about the risks and
beneﬁts of oﬀ-label uses is frequently known only by the manufacturer,
whose motivation is to generate sales. In evaluating oﬀ-label promotion as
commercial speech, courts must recognize that the current regulatory
scheme is a response to the tragedies that occurred under prior regimes,
when drugs could be freely promoted without proof of their safety or
eﬃcacy. Given the government’s strong interest in protecting the public
health through the approval process for new drugs, restrictions on oﬀ-label
promotion should withstand constitutional scrutiny, even in the current
climate of expanded protection for commercial speech.
Under the FDCA, each new drug must undergo a rigorous approval
process to show that it does what it purports to do and that, with respect to
its intended uses, the beneﬁts of the drug outweigh the risks. Id. § 355. The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged with overseeing the
approval process for new drugs. Part of that process includes reviewing all
of the manufacturer’s clinical studies, both positive and negative, and
approving a label that includes the indications, dosage, precautions, warnings, and contraindications. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2013). The FDA ensures
that the labeling is not “false or misleading in any particular.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(d). Introducing a drug into interstate commerce without proper
labeling constitutes the crime of “misbranding.” Id. §§ 331(a), 352(a).
Although FDA regulations do not directly prohibit oﬀ-label promotion,
†
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such promotion is tantamount to misbranding. Oral statements by pharmaceutical representatives may be used as evidence of a manufacturer’s
intended use for a drug, 21 C.F.R. § 201.128, thus rendering the drug’s
labeling subject to scrutiny under the misbranding provisions if it does not
contain “adequate directions for [that] use.” See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f); 21
C.F.R. § 201.5.
Although misbranding is a crime, oﬀ-label prescription is common, with
perhaps more than twenty percent of prescriptions written for oﬀ-label
uses. See David C. Radley et al., Oﬀ-label Prescribing Among Oﬃce-Based
Physicians, 166 A RCHIVES INTERNAL M ED . 1021, 1023 (2006). It is not
illegal for doctors to prescribe oﬀ-label and the FDCA clearly states that it
should not be construed to interfere with the practice of medicine. 21
U.S.C. § 396. Oﬀ-label prescriptions may have important beneﬁts, especially
in cases where there are no other treatment options available. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that oﬀ-label prescribing “is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate.” Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiﬀs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001). But pharmaceutical companies take advantage of the doctor’s right to prescribe oﬀ-label, targeting
doctors in order to reach new markets for unapproved uses, and thereby
avoiding the time and expense required by the FDA approval process.
Detailing, the practice of sales representatives visiting doctors in their
oﬃces to promote drugs, is especially eﬀective for oﬀ-label promotion. Not
only do companies spend substantially more money on marketing than on
research, but a substantial proportion of the marketing budget is allocated to
detailing. See Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Eﬀects and Role of
Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative
Review, 2 Y ALE J. H EALTH P OL ’Y L. & E THICS 785, 785-86 (2005).
Evidence shows that doctors are susceptible to these marketing techniques
and that their prescribing habits are impacted. See Adriane Fugh-Berman &
Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends and
Inﬂuence Doctors, 4 PL O S M ED . 621, 623-24 (2007). The practice of detailing
raises ethical issues as it may persuade doctors to prescribe unnecessary or
more expensive drugs; these concerns are compounded when sales representatives promote oﬀ-label uses that have not been proven safe and eﬀective.
The government has had considerable success in prosecuting drug manufacturers for oﬀ-label promotion. See, e.g., Erika Kelton, Oﬀ-Label Pharma
Prosecutions Won’t Be Silenced by First Amendment Decision, F ORBES (Jan. 4,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2013/01/04/oﬀ-label-pharmaprosecutions-wont-be-silenced-by-ﬁrst-amendment-decision. Increasingly,
however, pharmaceutical manufacturers have raised the First Amendment
as a defense to (or even in anticipation of) such charges. This defense,
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however, rests on manufacturers’ unsubstantiated claims that the information they provide is in fact truthful and not misleading. Furthermore, in
promoting drugs for oﬀ-label use, manufacturers bypass the FDA’s approval
process, upsetting a system that seeks to assess the risks and beneﬁts of
drugs for a particular, intended use. Seizing on language in recent Supreme
Court cases that struck down restraints on commercial speech, the industry
recently convinced the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that
its First Amendment argument has merit. See United States v. Caronia, 703
F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012). The Caronia decision, however, is fraught with
ﬂaws. First, the decision fails to recognize that the defendant’s oﬀ-label
promotion was evidence of his intent to misbrand the drug in question.
Second, in applying commercial free speech principles, the court gave
inadequate consideration to the importance of the FDA’s premarket
approval process, which is designed to protect the public health.
The pharmaceutical industry’s ﬁrst successful First Amendment challenge involved provisions of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) that restricted the dissemination of information
about oﬀ-label uses in printed materials such as medical journals. See Wash.
Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83, 87 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated
in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). As a result of that challenge, the
FDA altered its interpretation of FDAMA, characterizing it as providing a
“safe harbor” for drug manufacturers rather than authorizing the FDA to
prohibit or sanction speech. See Wash. Legal Found., 202 F.3d at 335. When
the FDAMA “safe harbor” provisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000),
expired, the FDA issued a new guidance document that loosened restrictions
on drug manufacturers’ distribution of medical or scientiﬁc journal articles
about oﬀ-label uses, but still required the information disseminated to be
reliable and scientiﬁc. See FDA, G UIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY : G OOD
R EPRINT P RACTICES FOR THE D ISTRIBUTION OF M EDICAL JOURNAL
A RTICLES AND M EDICAL OR S CIENTIFIC R EFERENCE P UBLICATIONS
ON U NAPPROVED N EW U SES OF A PPROVED D RUGS AND A PPROVED
OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
oc/op/goodreprint.html.
The early success of the Washington Legal Foundation litigation, as well as
a series of Supreme Court decisions expanding the scope of First Amendment protection for commercial speech, further emboldened the industry to
seek protection for oﬀ-label promotion in other arenas, such as the practice
of detailing. Recent Supreme Court decisions expanding protection of
commercial speech have demonstrated concern with promoting the free
ﬂow of factual, veriﬁable commercial information to help consumers make
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informed decisions. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court held that a
Vermont statute that prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using
prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes violated the First
Amendment. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). And in Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center, the Court held that a law that prohibited pharmacies from
advertising speciﬁc compounded drugs also violated the First Amendment.
��� U.S. ���, ��� (����). Unlike the factual, veriﬁable information involved
in these cases, claims regarding oﬀ-label promotion through detailing are
not veriﬁable because only the manufacturer has access to all of the positive
and negative scientiﬁc evidence about the drug. Because meetings between
doctors and sales representatives occur in the doctor’s oﬃce and are not
open to public scrutiny, it is impossible to know whether the communicated
content is truthful or misleading. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Shifting
Terrain in the Regulation of Oﬀ-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 360 N EW
E NG . J. M ED . 1557, 1558 (2009), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
michelle-mello/ﬁles/����/��/Oﬀ-label_PDF.pdf. More importantly, by
choosing to promote oﬀ-label, manufacturers succeed in evading the FDA
approval process, which would require submission of all clinical trial evidence—
both positive and negative. This process is in place speciﬁcally to provide
doctors and the public as much truthful and reliable information as possible.
The Supreme Court’s concern that consumers have the information they
need to make informed decisions also dictates against protecting oﬀ-label
marketing. Courts have mistakenly assumed that doctors are able to discern
misleading from nonmisleading information provided by drug manufacturers.
In IMS Health, the Court referred to doctors as “sophisticated and experienced” consumers. 131 S. Ct. at 2671 (citation omitted). The medical
literature, however, demonstrates that doctors are not able to distinguish
between valid and misleading information. Doctors learn about new products primarily from the pharmaceutical industry and it is rare for them to
read in depth about new drugs. J EROME G ROOPMAN , H OW D OCTORS
T HINK 221 (2007).
In United States v. Caronia, a panel of the Second Circuit held in a 2–1
decision that provisions of the FDCA could not be interpreted to prohibit
truthful, oﬀ-label promotion. 703 F.3d at 162. In so holding, the court
improperly applied the Supreme Court’s analysis in Western States and IMS
Health. Perhaps most importantly, the court did not have the opportunity to
consider whether the defendant’s statements were truthful and not misleading. If it had, the First Amendment defense would not have succeeded.
The government charged Alfred Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales representative, with misbranding when he promoted the drug Xyrem® for off-label
use. Id. at 152. Xyrem is a powerful depressant that the FDA approved for
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two indications associated with narcolepsy, a serious sleep disorder. Id. at
155. Xyrem contains a black box warning, the most serious warning the
FDA issues, because its side eﬀects include seizures, coma, and death. Id.
According to the government, Caronia conspired to misbrand the drug
because he promoted it for unapproved uses such as insomnia, ﬁbromyalgia,
muscle disorders, and chronic pain. Id. at 156-57. Caronia was under substantial pressure to sell the drug for oﬀ-label uses as representatives were
required to meet an annual sales quota and Caronia was near the bottom of
his company’s national sales force. Id. at 172 n.3 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
Caronia maintained that he was prosecuted for truthful, nonmisleading
speech. See id. at 160 (majority opinion). The truthfulness of his speech,
however, was never an issue at trial since the government believed it needed
to show only that he promoted the drug for an oﬀ-label use. Id. Thus, the
court never considered whether Xyrem was safe or eﬀective for the uses
that Caronia proposed. Had the truthfulness or misleading nature of
Caronia’s claims been at the heart of the case, the court’s analysis would
have been quite diﬀerent. The Supreme Court has held that the government is “free to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is
false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes an illegal transaction.”
Zauderer v. Oﬃce of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985)
(citations omitted). More recently, the Court identiﬁed the threshold
inquiry in commercial speech cases as whether the speech is misleading:
misleading speech, the Court stated, “is not protected by the First Amendment.” Western States, 535 U.S. at 367.
In prosecuting Caronia, the government could have emphasized the false
and misleading nature of the oﬀ-label promotion, particularly because
Caronia promoted the drug as “very safe.” Caronia, 703 F.3d at 157. Instead,
the government emphasized only the oﬀ-label nature of the promotion and
the defendant’s intent to misbrand the drug by introducing it into commerce. Id. at 158-59. A divided panel concluded that Caronia had been
improperly convicted for his speech. Although the jury instructions included
explanations about the elements of misbranding and conspiring to misbrand, the court found that the government’s summation, together with the
jury instructions, gave the impression that the oﬀ-label promotion itself was
prohibited. See id. To avoid conﬂict with the First Amendment, the court
concluded that the FDCA should not be construed as criminalizing the
simple promotion of a drug’s oﬀ-label use. Id. at 160.
The court should have considered Caronia’s speech as evidence of his
intent to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate commerce. In Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment “does not
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prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or
to prove motive or intent.” 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). Thus, the problem the
government encountered in Caronia may be rectiﬁed by a change in emphasis from oﬀ-label speech to intent to misbrand.
Because it considered Caronia’s statements truthful, nonmisleading
speech, the Second Circuit used IMS Health as a template for its First
Amendment analysis. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164. In IMS Health, the Court
oﬀered two diﬀerent standards for assessing the constitutionality of commercial speech. In addition to citing the traditional Central Hudson test for
commercial speech restrictions, IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68, the Court
found that “heightened judicial scrutiny” was required because the speech
involved “viewpoint discrimination,” with both content- and speaker-based
restrictions. Id. at 2663-64. The Court found that the law disfavored speech
with a particular content (marketing), when expressed by certain disfavored
speakers (pharmaceutical manufacturers). Id. at 2663. According to the
Court, the Vermont legislature designed the law—which prohibited pharmaceutical companies from using prescriber-identifying information to
market their drugs—to prevent marketers from more eﬀectively selling
high-cost, brand-name drugs, rather than the lower priced, generic drugs
favored by the state. Id. at 2661. Heightened scrutiny is required, the Court
stated, “whenever the government creates ‘a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.’” Id. at 2664 (citing Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
The Caronia court determined that heightened scrutiny was required to
assess the constitutionality of restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion because
the restrictions are content-based in that they distinguish between favored
speech (uses that are FDA-approved) and disfavored speech (uses that are
not FDA-approved). 703 F.3d at 165. Further, prohibiting oﬀ-label promotion is speaker-based, the court reasoned, because it targets one kind of
speaker (pharmaceutical manufacturers and their representatives) while
allowing others (such as doctors and academics) to speak freely about oﬀlabel uses. Id.
In applying heightened scrutiny, the Second Circuit suggested that an
agency seeking to uphold its own regulatory system is viewpoint discriminatory. This analysis simply makes no sense. The purpose of prohibiting oﬀlabel promotion is to protect the public health by ensuring that both doctors
and consumers receive accurate, scientiﬁcally based information—a mission
accomplished through the FDA approval process. The court’s analysis leads
to the conclusion that distinguishing between approved and unapproved
drugs is viewpoint discriminatory, a conclusion that would make the entire
FDA approval process unconstitutional.
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The Second Circuit also made fatal errors in applying the Central Hudson
test. To survive Central Hudson, the government must prove that its regulation of nonmisleading speech regarding a lawful activity: (1) stems from a
substantial government interest; (2) directly advances that interest; and (3)
is not more extensive than necessary. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). The district court in
Caronia found that each element was satisﬁed: (1) the government has a
substantial interest in the health and safety of its citizens, as well as in
subjecting drugs to the FDA premarket approval process; (2) prohibiting
oﬀ-label promotion directly advances that interest; and (3) the misbranding
provisions are no more extensive than necessary because restricting marketing behavior is one of the few methods by which the FDA can encourage
manufacturers to seek FDA approval for news uses of a drug. See United States
v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 398-402 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), rev’d, 703 F.3d 149.
The Second Circuit’s focus on the lawfulness of prescribing oﬀ-label,
and on the fact that the FDA anticipated some oﬀ-label use, Caronia, 703
F.3d at 166, ignores the fundamental nature of the speech involved. The
doctor’s decision to prescribe is not commercial speech; it is the oﬀ-label
promotion that must be scrutinized. The Second Circuit also concluded that
restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion interfere “paternalistically” with both
doctors’ and patients’ access to information about oﬀ-label use. Id. Restricting oﬀ-label promotion, however, is not a paternalistic eﬀort by the FDA to
keep doctors and patients in the dark about new treatments. It is, on the
contrary, a corollary of the very core of the FDA’s mission to assure doctors
and the public that drugs have been proven safe and eﬀective.
In IMS Health and Western States, the Supreme Court expressed concern
about paternalistic regulation, but its concern centered on ensuring that the
public received truthful, nonmisleading information. How can the truthfulness of oﬀ-label information be assessed? Access to all of the manufacturer’s
in-house clinical trial protocols and research reports—both positive and
negative—as well as its marketing strategy, might be a starting point,
although it is unlikely that manufacturers would be willing to disclose such
information. The truthfulness of oﬀ-label information is speculative,
unknown, or inaccessible. One author has wisely suggested that when
manufacturers raise truthfulness as a defense, the manufacturer should bear
the burden of proving the truthfulness of its oﬀ-label claims. See Christopher
Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion
Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 127-31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=2318618.
Because the truth of oﬀ-label promotion cannot be presumed or proven
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without access to all of the manufacturer’s research, restricting its use is
consistent with Supreme Court decisions that place a premium on ensuring
that consumers receive truthful, nonmisleading information.
FDA regulations reﬂect the policy—supported by extensive evidence—
that drugs should be promoted based on scientiﬁc proof that they are safe
and eﬀective, not on anecdotal information, conjecture, or proﬁt motives. In
Western States, the Supreme Court recognized that “[p]reserving the eﬀectiveness and integrity of the FDCA’s new drug approval process is clearly
an important governmental interest, and the Government has every reason
to want as many drugs as possible to be subject to that approval process.”
535 U.S. at 369. To that end, the government should continue to prosecute
drug manufacturers for oﬀ-label promotion. With a focus on the false and
misleading nature of oﬀ-label claims, as well as the intent to misbrand, the
problems the government encountered in Caronia are easily overcome.
Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent, while expansive in its protection
of commercial speech, does not support protecting speech that bypasses the
truth-seeking mission of the FDA’s approval process. The First Amendment should not be manipulated to protect information that has the potential to unleash unknown risks and dangers on an unsuspecting public.
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R EBUTTAL
Permission to Speak Freely?
LARS N OAH†
If the law is against you, argue the facts.
If the law and the facts are against you, pound the table and yell like hell.
Carl Sandburg (1936)
Professor Greene essentially concedes that all of the recent decisional
law cuts against her position, so instead she relies on generalizations about
overeager sales representatives, gullible doctors, and untested oﬀ-label uses.
Her focus on the admittedly garbled decision in United States v. Caronia, 703
F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), fundamentally misconceives what’s at stake in this
debate, and she fails to mention that the Department of Justice decided not
to ﬁle a petition for certiorari in that case. See David Sell, U.S. Won’t Pursue
Case of Pharma Salesman, P HILA . INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 2013, at A23. Perhaps
the government feared that the Supreme Court might take the occasion to
put another nail in the coﬃn of FDA speech regulation.
No one doubts that, several times in recent years, pharmaceutical companies have promoted oﬀ-label uses in genuinely misleading ways. For
instance, Warner-Lambert’s campaign for the anticonvulsant Neurontin®
(gabapentin) attracted plenty of justiﬁed criticism. See Stephanie Greene,
False Claims Act Liability for Oﬀ-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products,
110 P ENN S T . L. R EV . 41, 59-60 (2005); Michael A. Steinman et al.,
Narrative Review, The Promotion of Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal
Industry Documents, 145 A NNALS INTERNAL M ED . 284, 290 (2006); see also
In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 51 (1st Cir.)
(aﬃrming a ���� million judgment in favor of health insurers), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 786 (2013). Whether the controversy involved Neurontin or the
narcolepsy drug Xyrem® (at issue in Caronia), the fact that the promoted
uses happened not to appear in the approved labeling struck me as entirely
beside the point—the companies would have found themselves in equally
†
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hot water had they made the same unfounded claims of safety and eﬀectiveness about the on-label uses of their drugs, see 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)
(2013), and the First Amendment does not stand in the way of sanctioning
such advertising.
Professor Greene criticizes the federal prosecutors in Caronia for failing
to emphasize the misleading nature of the defendant’s statements (e.g.,
calling Xyrem “very safe,” 703 F.3d at 157, even for its approved uses seems
entirely outrageous given the black box warning), but why would they go to
that trouble when oﬀ-label promotion alone, which requires far less proof,
runs afoul of federal law? If the FDA’s ﬂat prohibition on any mention of
such uses fails constitutional scrutiny, then the government would have to
shoulder the greater burden of proving in what respect a drug advertisement included a false or misleading claim. The First Amendment demands
no less, and it represents sheer hyperbole to suggest that a contrary conclusion would somehow imperil the FDA’s entire system of pharmaceutical
regulation. Even without the current advertising prohibitions, drug manufacturers would have incentives to seek agency approval for new indications
because, for instance, health insurers often restrict reimbursement for oﬀlabel uses. See Joshua Cohen et al., Oﬀ-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 F OOD
& D RUG L.J. 391, 397-98 (2009).
To put the constitutional issue in stark relief, assume that a seller can
adequately substantiate an appropriately limited claim of safety and eﬀectiveness for an oﬀ-label use and also makes clear (by a prominent disclaimer
or otherwise) that the use has not received the FDA’s blessing. Imagine that
Pharmerica Inc. has developed a novel anticoagulant. As required by federal
law, it cannot begin selling this new drug without ﬁrst securing a license
from the Agency based on substantial testing conducted ﬁrst in preclinical
(animal) studies and then in clinical (human) trials. See L ARS N OAH , L AW ,
M EDICINE , AND M EDICAL T ECHNOLOGY 260-64, 270-71 (3d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter N OAH , M EDICAL T ECHNOLOGY]. By all accounts, the
process of testing an investigational compound and then securing approval
of a new drug application (NDA) requires a substantial investment of time
and resources, averaging on the order of a dozen years and over $1 billion.
See id. at 261. Assume that this investigational drug beats the odds, see id. at
158, and receives FDA approval for use in guarding against blood clots in
patients at a heightened risk of stroke.
A few years after Pharmerica introduces its prescription drug under the
fanciful brand name Ridaclot, independent researchers using an unimpeachable
study design and applying conventions for statistical signiﬁcance discover
that the drug also slows cognitive decline in the earliest stages of Alzheimer’s disease. The results of their work appear in the Archives of Geriatric
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Neurology, a respected but somewhat obscure peer-reviewed journal, and the
popular press fails to report these ﬁndings to a much wider audience.
Wholly apart from opening a potentially lucrative new market, Pharmerica
believes that it has a public responsibility to ensure that these results get
disseminated more broadly to physicians; after all, Alzheimer’s patients
currently have few promising treatment options, and nothing would prevent
physicians from prescribing Ridaclot for this purpose.
Under FDA regulations that go back almost half a century, however,
Pharmerica cannot share any information about such an oﬀ-label use with
doctors. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (advertising may not “recommend
or suggest any use that is not in the labeling accepted in such approved
new-drug application or supplement”); id. § 202.1(e)(6)(i), (xi) (same); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3) (2012) (providing that a prescription drug shall be
deemed to be misbranded unless its seller includes in all advertisements a
true statement of “such other information . . . as shall be required in
regulations”). But see Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160 (concluding inaccurately that
the “regulations do not expressly prohibit or criminalize oﬀ-label promotion”). No matter how carefully it structures the communication to avoid
overstating the results or implying that the Agency has approved the
indication, the company could not mention use in treating Alzheimer’s
disease anywhere in its labeling or advertising (in print or other medium)
for the drug. Pharmerica ﬁrst would have to ﬁle a supplemental new drug
application (SNDA) and await the Agency’s imprimatur. See Lars Noah,
Constraints on the Oﬀ-Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. P ROD . &
T OXICS L IAB. ���, ��� & n.�� (����). Although such “eﬃcacy supplements” require far less eﬀort than the original NDA, they are neither cheap
nor fast (nor invariably successful). See id. at 145 & n.26. Even in the
unlikely event that the sponsor could submit the previously published
research rather than undertake its own expensive trials to satisfy the FDA’s
demanding standards, the application fee itself would cost over $1 million.
See Notice, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2014, 78 Fed.
Reg. 46,980, 46,984 tbl.7 (Aug. 2, 2013).
If the Agency rejects the SNDA because it remains unpersuaded about
the utility of the drug for Alzheimer’s patients, Pharmerica would have to
remain silent about this use. If approved, the SNDA would authorize the
company to add a line or two to the list of indications in the package insert,
which in turn would allow the company to advertise this now on-label use,
but in all other respects the product would remain identical to the one
originally introduced. In short, Pharmerica needed the FDA’s permission to
speak, in this hypothetical, by expending millions of extra dollars (and
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waiting several more years) to secure a license that would authorize it to
communicate truthful information about an entirely permissible use of an
already lawfully marketed product. Indeed, the FDA regularly (if belatedly)
approves oﬀ-label uses, see N OAH , M EDICAL T ECHNOLOGY, supra, at 27273, which suggests that the earlier evidence favoring such uses had some
justiﬁcation after all, even before the Agency oﬃcially concurred. Perhaps I
am just seeing the proverbial glass as (almost) half full, but the oft-cited
survey that Professor Greene references concluded that more than a quarter
of identiﬁed oﬀ-label uses “were supported by strong scientiﬁc evidence”
(even Neurontin hit nearly ��%) and some unspeciﬁed additional fraction
presumably had at least limited scientiﬁc support. See David C. Radley et
al., Oﬀ-label Prescribing Among Oﬃce-Based Physicians, 166 A RCHIVES
INTERNAL M ED . 1021, 1023 (2006).
Pharmerica might skip the SNDA step by ﬁnding indirect methods of
getting the word out about the oﬀ-label use of Ridaclot. It could purchase
thousands of reprints of the published article and mail these to physicians
around the country, and it could sponsor continuing medical education
(CME) programs where the authors of the study could discuss their results.
Although at present no regulations speciﬁcally address such quasipromotional campaigns, the FDA has issued nonbinding guidance documents that indicate it would permit these sorts of eﬀorts only under the
narrowest of circumstances. The FDA recently revoked the 2009 guidance
cited by Professor Greene that had addressed the mailing of reprints,
replacing it with a draft guidance document that speciﬁes when manufacturer involvement in the dissemination of such materials would not draw
the Agency’s ire. See Notice of Availability, Revised Draft Guidance for
Industry on Distributing Scientiﬁc and Medical Publications on Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,793 (Mar. 3,
2014); see also Notice, Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientiﬁc and
Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074 (Dec. 3, 1997) (focusing on
CME events).
Unlike other FDA advertising regulations that aim to guard against particular types of potentially false or misleading claims, the blanket prohibition on any statements concerning oﬀ-label uses sweeps broadly to prevent the
dissemination of information even if it is presented in an entirely truthful and
nonmisleading way. Surely this arrangement would strike First Amendment
scholars as at least mildly perplexing, if not blatantly unconstitutional. Many
academics think that the Supreme Court’s increasing solicitude for “commercial speech” is profoundly misguided, but that represents another debate
altogether. For purposes of resolving the question at hand, we need to take
as given the commercial speech doctrine as presently conﬁgured, particularly
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as set forth in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357
(2002), which invalidated a federal prohibition on advertising by pharmacists about compounded drugs. In contrast, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653 (2011), which invalidated a state prohibition on prescription data
mining used by drug companies to facilitate more targeted pitches to
individual physicians, strikes me as an outlier. The court in Caronia may
very well have given that peculiar decision undue emphasis, as Professor
Greene suggests, but prohibitions on oﬀ-label advertising fail heightened
scrutiny even without IMS Health.
In previous work, I have recounted the skirmishing in the lower courts
over the FDA’s limited allowance for indirect advertising of oﬀ-label drug
uses to physicians. See Lars Noah, What’s Wrong with “Constitutionalizing
Food and Drug Law”?, 75 T UL. L. R EV . 137 (2000); see also Wash. Legal
Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting my
earlier work for the proposition that “the FDA is not a peer review mechanism for the scientiﬁc community”). More recently, I have explained that,
when one fully appreciates the potentially radical aspects of Western States,
even the Agency’s prohibitions on direct advertising may fail a constitutional challenge. See Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free
Speech vs. Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 H EALTH M ATRIX 31, 7275 (2011); see also id. at 76-84 (questioning the constitutionality of restrictions
on indirect promotion); id. at 85-�� (same, for eﬀorts directed at patients).
Western States has gotten remarkably little attention from commentators. See
id. at 64 & n.147. Indeed, Professor Greene’s ���� article on oﬀ-label
promotion included a First Amendment analysis that never once cited this
decision, and her selective references to it here entirely fail to do this
important decision justice.
To my mind, the Supreme Court’s evident deployment of the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine in the context of commercial speech represents the most striking aspect of Western States. For purposes of this debate,
it means that the FDA cannot pursue its ends through the back door either.
Let us say that the Agency had not directly prohibited the advertising of
oﬀ-label uses; under the statute, the FDA still could prosecute a company
for selling an approved drug, if it lacked approval for some of its “intended
uses,” by pointing to the company’s advertising of those oﬀ-label uses (or,
as the government had charged in Caronia, for “misbranding” the drug in
failing to provide “adequate directions” for these additional intended uses).
Western States apparently prevents even that maneuver, however, because
the threat of sanctioning conduct in this manner unduly burdens commercial speech. See id. at 54-57 & nn.110-12.
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More generally, the Supreme Court seems to have eﬀectively barred
advertising restrictions that serve any purpose other than guarding against
potentially false or misleading claims. See id. at 67-68. Whenever government seeks to pursue collateral purposes such as dampening consumer
demand, non-speech-restrictive alternatives (e.g., barring the underlying
conduct) invariably exist for accomplishing such goals. Or, if the government wants to encourage drug companies to seek FDA approval of oﬀ-label
uses, then it can oﬀer incentives such as extended market exclusivity
periods. See id. at 74-75 & n.186. Furthermore, in guarding against potentially false or misleading claims, the Court routinely suggests disclaimer
requirements as less-speech-restrictive alternatives, even if audiences
routinely fail to read the small print. In the context of prescription drug
advertising, health care professionals remain the primary audience, which
makes a preference for disclaimers over ﬂat prohibitions easier to swallow.
Surely physicians comprehend what it means to say that a particular use
qualiﬁes as oﬀ-label, even if in other respects their information-processing skills
are not nearly as good as people assume. See id. at 65-66, 72-73 & nn.178-79.
Indeed, making prophylactic rules seems inevitably less carefully tailored for this purpose than case-by-case enforcement to squelch particular
instances of false or misleading advertising. The FDA’s preference to
control drug advertising by issuing broad regulations dates back to an era
before commercial speech enjoyed any constitutional protection. Once that
changed in the mid-1970s, the Federal Trade Commission’s adjudicatory
approach—and demand that sellers be able to substantiate whatever claims
they wish to make—represents the more acceptable procedural choice.
Professor Greene explains that the FDA cannot easily discover what
transpires in doctors’ oﬃces during visits from sales reps, and she also
suspects that the purported evidentiary support for oﬀ-label uses will
remain hidden at company headquarters. Successful recent prosecutions
seemingly belie such practical concerns, but, even if they have some force,
ease of enforcement alone would never justify an overbroad restriction on
commercial speech. See id. at 60 n.132. Is Professor Greene suggesting that
the First Amendment would allow the Agency to go still further than it has
already and forbid detailing altogether in order to guard against the possibility
that drug reps might pitch unfounded oﬀ-label claims to unsuspecting doctors?
Lastly, the FDA’s increasingly popular practice of issuing technically
nonbinding guidance documents while counting on its power to cajole—a
cagey if not always successful eﬀort to shield its dubious policies from
judicial scrutiny and avoid other forms of accountability—seems to represent the least defensible method of all when First Amendment rights hang in
the balance. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indiﬀerence
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to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 C ORNELL L. R EV . 901, 905-06
(2008); id. at ��� (“The FDA formulated its [indirect] oﬀ-label promotion
policies in a manner designed to evade normal administrative law constraints.”). See generally Lars Noah, Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 N EB. L. R EV . (forthcoming Aug. 2014).
The Agency’s unambiguous regulations, noncommittal guidance documents,
and threats of prosecution (or adverse action on pending license applications) make companies understandably hesitant to engage in constitutionally protected communications about oﬀ-label uses of their products (or even
dare mount judicial challenges to the FDA’s policies). In contrast, a regime
of case-by-case scrutiny to screen out false or misleading claims would pose a
far reduced risk of chilling legitimate communications about oﬀ-label drug uses.
Let me close by quoting what struck me as Professor Greene’s most
cringeworthy statement: “by choosing to promote oﬀ-label, manufacturers
succeed in evading the FDA approval process, which . . . . is in place
speciﬁcally to provide doctors and the public as much truthful and reliable
information as possible.” As the judge in the previously cited Washington
Legal Foundation litigation put it: “In asserting that any and all scientiﬁc
claims about . . . prescription drugs are presumptively untruthful or misleading until the FDA has had the opportunity to evaluate them, FDA
exaggerates its overall place in the universe.” 13 F. Supp. 2d at 67. The
Agency’s rules barring any and all direct claims about oﬀ-label uses of
pharmaceutical products unmistakably operate to keep truthful information
from doctors in ways that the Supreme Court no longer allows. Then again,
insofar as Professor Greene urges prosecutors to target false or misleading
aspects of particular oﬀ-label promotional eﬀorts (and favors academic
proposals to demand that companies substantiate claims), our positions on
the constitutional question may not be so far apart after all.
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C LOSING STATEMENT
The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth
STEPHANIE M. G REENE
The history of pharmaceutical marketing practices and concern for the
public health support restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion of drugs. Although
the pharmaceutical industry has had some success with First Amendment
challenges to restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion, the case law is hardly
decisive. The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d
149 (2d Cir. 2012), is but one decision, and not a unanimous or wellreasoned one at that. In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, the court
limited its holding to “a very narrow form of manufacturer communication.”
13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasis in original), vacated in part,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Although the court found that FDA Guidance on dissemination of certain promotional materials was more restrictive
than necessary, it did not dispute that many restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion are necessary to incentivize manufacturers to seek FDA approval. The
court recognized that there are “enormous diﬀerences between the permitted marketing of on-label as opposed to oﬀ-label uses” and that many other
types of communication regarding oﬀ-label uses, including “person-toperson contact with a physician,” were still prohibited. Id. Its decision to
allow dissemination of some materials about oﬀ-label uses was premised on
the fact that the remaining restrictions were adequate to safeguard the FDA
approval process and the public health. The court noted that “[w]ere manufacturers permitted to engage in all [other] forms of marketing of oﬀ-label treatments, a
diﬀerent result might be compelled.” Id. Furthermore, although the Supreme
Court has clearly broadened protection for commercial speech, I believe that the
Court would ﬁnd restrictions on oﬀ-label promotion constitutional.
Referring to the Court’s decision in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002), Professor Noah maintains that “the Supreme
Court seems to have eﬀectively barred advertising restrictions that serve
any purpose other than guarding against potentially false or misleading
claims.” Even if the Court insists on expanding protection of commercial
speech to that limit, the case can be made that promotion of unapproved
uses is “potentially false or misleading.” Further, restrictions on oﬀ-label
promotion survive constitutional scrutiny because they are no more restrictive
of speech than necessary to maintain the integrity of the FDA premarket
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approval process and to protect the public health. Cf. id. at 371-73 (striking
down restrictions on advertising speciﬁc compounding practices because
less-speech-restrictive alternatives could have protected the government’s
substantial interest in preserving the integrity of the FDA’s new drug
approval process while ensuring the availability of certain unapproved
compounded drugs).
As the Court speciﬁcally recognized in Western States, preserving the
FDA’s new drug approval process is an important government interest and
“the Government has every reason to want as many drugs as possible to be
subject to that approval process.” Id. at 369. Professor Noah does not
dispute the importance of this interest, but suggests that disclaimers and
postmarket enforcement of false and misleading claims are preferable to
“prophylactic rules.” Prophylactic rules, however, are at the very core of the
FDCA. Decades of congressional hearings (in the 1950s and 1960s) that
considered pharmaceutical marketing practices “showed that the pharmaceutical marketplace was ﬁlled with misleading promotional material on
which physicians relied.” Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug
Experiences: Congress Had Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the
Promotion of Prescription Drugs, 58 F OOD & D RUG L.J. 299, 301-02 (2003).
The hearings also amassed “abundant evidence to support the conclusion
that alternatives, such as disclaimers disclosing the state of the evidence
supporting a claim, and postmarket enforcement actions, were inadequate to
stop deceptive and dangerous products.” Id. at 300. Postmarket enforcement
takes months or even years, during which time a drug remains on the
market, exposing patients to dangerous or ineﬀective treatment. Disclaimers are a poor method of controlling oﬀ-label promotion because evidence
shows that they have a limited impact on physicians and that consumers
frequently misinterpret or ignore them. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Oﬀ-Label
Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health Goals and Commercial Speech,
37 A M . J.L. & M ED . 225, 250-51 (2011) [hereinafter Kesselheim, Oﬀ-Label
Drug Use and Promotion].
While pharmaceutical companies assert that doctors are the target audience of oﬀ-label promotion, the risks and consequences associated with
unapproved drugs are passed on to patients who are frequently unaware of a
drug’s unapproved status and receive no information with which to assess
the risks and beneﬁts of a disclaimer. Recognizing the inﬂuence that
marketing has on physicians’ prescribing habits and the risks inherent in
oﬀ-label promotion, Dr. Kesselheim and others have stated that physicians
themselves will need to be the “bulwark against oﬀ-label promotion.” See
Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Oﬀ-Label Marketing of
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Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, PL O S
M ED ., Apr. 2011, at 7 [hereinafter Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices].
While physicians play a critical role in assessing the merits of oﬀ-label
promotion, the legal system must also fulﬁll its role in appropriately
balancing First Amendment concerns with the risks of such promotion.
In addition to disclaimers and postmarket enforcement, other lessspeech-restrictive policies have been proposed as alternatives to prohibiting
oﬀ-label promotion, including taxing oﬀ-label use, requiring FDA review of
oﬀ-label use that reaches a certain threshold, and extending market exclusivity for manufacturers who seek approval for oﬀ-label use. These alternatives
place inadequate emphasis on patient safety and assume the ability to
monitor expanding oﬀ-label use. See Kesselheim, Oﬀ-Label Drug Use and
Promotion, supra, at 251-52. Reducing the ﬁnancial incentive to introduce
unapproved uses to the market may be a more direct way to control oﬀ-label
promotion. See Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption to Manage
Inappropriate Oﬀ-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 659-60 (2013).
In considering whether less-speech-restrictive alternatives are suﬃcient
to maintain the integrity of the FDA premarket approval process and to
protect the public health, courts should be mindful that Congress considered and rejected alternatives such as disclaimers and postmarket enforcement as insuﬃcient safeguards. After extensive examination of the
pharmaceutical industry, the battle for a drug preapproval process based on
safety and eﬃcacy was won in ���� with the passage of the Kefauver–Harris
Amendments. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780. The industry will undoubtedly continue to push for changes that
provide new opportunities to promote oﬀ-label. Legislators and regulators
must recognize that powerful industries have the ability to shape legislative
and administrative rules to protect their interests. See Malcolm S. Salter,
Lawful but Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the
Private Sector (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-060, 2010) (manuscript at 14-25), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20
Files/11-060.pdf.
In addition to withstanding First Amendment scrutiny under Central
Hudson analysis, there are strong arguments that oﬀ-label promotion is
“inherently misleading” and therefore not deserving of First Amendment
protection at all. See Waxman, supra, at 306-10. Because manufacturers are
adept at disguising promotional speech as truthful, nonmisleading, and
unbiased discourse, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between “oﬀ-label promotion”
and “non-promotional speech.” See Kesselheim, Oﬀ-Label Drug Use and
Promotion, supra, at 251. Professor Noah’s hypothetical about “truthful and
nonmisleading” oﬀ-label promotion demonstrates the many conditions that
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must be satisﬁed to ensure that oﬀ-label promotion is not misleading. The
Pharmerica hypothetical assumes that a drug study yielding positive results
for the treatment of Alzheimer’s is conducted by “independent researchers
using an unimpeachable study design.” Given these qualiﬁcations, the
information from the study might well be “truthful” but still we must ask:
does it represent the whole truth? Doctors and patients should be informed
whether the study can be replicated and whether any other studies yielded
negative results. Research indicates that pharmaceutical companies are less
likely to publish unfavorable results and even threaten researchers who
intend to expose negative studies. See Donald W. Light et al., Institutional
Corruption of Pharmaceuticals and the Myth of Safe and Eﬀective Drugs, 41 J.L.
M ED . & E THICS 590, 595 (2013).
Professor Noah’s hypothetical poses the rare case in which oﬀ-label
marketing is purportedly needed to address a heartbreaking disease that has
few, if any, eﬀective approved treatments. It posits that the manufacturer
believes it has a “public responsibility” to broadly disseminate information
about this study to physicians. Research indicates, however, that the goal of
oﬀ-label marketing schemes is to generate more revenue than FDAapproved indications could. See Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices,
supra, at 3. Many real-world examples illustrate this point. Pﬁzer’s drug
Bextra®, approved to treat arthritis and menstrual cramps, was widely
promoted for oﬀ-label use in treating acute and surgical pain, in dosages
well above those approved by the FDA. Gardiner Harris, Pﬁzer Pays ��.�
Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. T IMES (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html. Risks to the kidney, heart,
and skin were associated with increased dosages of the drug and it was
eventually withdrawn because of these risks. Id. Although Pﬁzer paid ��.�
billion to settle claims associated with the oﬀ-label promotion of Bextra and
three other drugs, the $16.8 billion in revenues that it earned from those drugs
demonstrates not only how eﬀective oﬀ-label marketing can be, but also how
dearly patients and the healthcare system pay. See Rodwin, supra, at 658.
When projected sales are high enough, the risk of paying ﬁnes for oﬀlabel promotion is apparently worth taking. For example, proﬁts from the
sale of Neurontin® for its FDA-approved use (treating epilepsy) were
projected at approximately $500 million. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., No. 04-10739, 2011 WL 3852254, at *6 (D. Mass. Aug. 31,
2011), aﬀ ’d, 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013). An oﬀ-label marketing strategy,
commenced in 1995, catapulted sales from $97.5 million to $2.7 billion by
2003, with nearly 90% of Neurontin prescriptions written for oﬀ-label uses.
See id. at *8; P.A. Francis, Pﬁzer Inc. Guilty, PHARMABIZ (May 19, 2004),
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http://saﬀron.pharmabiz.com/article/detnews.asp?articleid=21919&sectionid=
47&z=y. Neurontin’s manufacturer ultimately paid $430 million to settle
civil and criminal charges associated with oﬀ-label promotion—a fraction of
its increased proﬁts from the drug’s oﬀ-label sales. Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil
Health Care Liability Relating to Oﬀ-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
The oft-cited study concluding that “[a]mong oﬀ-label mentions, most
(��%) lacked evidence of clinical eﬃcacy, and less than one third (��%) were
supported by strong scientiﬁc evidence,” David C. Radley et al., Oﬀ-label
Prescribing Among Oﬃce-Based Physicians, 166 A RCHIVES INTERNAL M ED .
����, ���� (����), underscores this problem. The fact that some oﬀ-label
uses are ultimately proven safe and eﬀective is little comfort to the patients
and payers who have been subjected to the risks and costs of unsafe and
ineﬀective uses.
Assuming the facts that Professor Noah proposes, however, we would
surely want the medical community to receive information about a promising treatment for Alzheimer’s. The most recent FDA guidelines indicate
that the FDA would not view dissemination of a scientiﬁc or medical
journal article about such a study as evidence of intent that the product be
put to an unapproved use. See Notice of Availability, Revised Draft Guidance for Industry on Distributing Scientiﬁc and Medical Publications on
Unapproved New Uses—Recommended Practices, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,793,
11,794-95 (Mar. 3, 2014). In fact, the hypothetical assumes several of the
safeguards that the FDA recommends: the study is conducted by independent researchers; there is adequate substantiation for claims of safety and
eﬃcacy; and the study appears in a peer-reviewed journal. See id. The
FDA’s guidelines further suggest that the article be disseminated with the
approved labeling; a comprehensive bibliography; publications that reach
contrary results; and prominent disclosures of the drug’s unapproved status,
as well as potential conﬂicts of interest (including ﬁnancial interests) of the
study’s authors. Id. These requirements are surely essential in assessing the
reliability of the study. The FDA’s thinking on dissemination of peerreviewed journal articles is based on evidence that disseminated material
does not always accurately or fairly reﬂect the current state of knowledge
about the use in question and that manufacturers have little incentive to
publish information that discredits the use of their drug. Thus the guidelines that the FDA provides support the dissemination of information in a
manner that should inform recipients of its reliability, a goal that is consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence.
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It should also be noted that the FDA speciﬁcally recognizes the importance of making new treatments available to patients, especially when
there are few, if any, existing treatments. The FDA has created several
processes to help accelerate availability of new treatments: Fast Track,
Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, and Priority Review. See For
Consumers: Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority
Review: Expediting Availability of New Drugs for Patients with Serious Conditions, FDA (June 26, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumersByAudience/
ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstoImportantNewTherapies/ucm128291.htm.
The Fast Track process recognizes Alzheimer’s as a “serious condition[]”
that merits expedited review. Id.
Professor Noah and I seem to disagree most fundamentally on the
trustworthiness of the industry’s marketing practices. Professor Noah points
out that the FDA’s regulations controlling drug advertisements date back to
an era before commercial speech enjoyed any constitutional protection. The
current expansive protection for commercial speech, however, is not
without limits. Erosion of restrictions turns the clock back to the days when
manufacturers could sell their products with no proof of safety and eﬃcacy.
In 1999, in the midst of its campaign to promote gabapentin (Neurontin)
for oﬀ-label uses, a Pﬁzer executive proclaimed the drug to be “the ‘snake
oil’ of the twentieth century.” See Jim Edwards, Lesson From Pﬁzer: Don’t
Describe Your Product as “Snake Oil” in Internal Email, CBS M ONEY W ATCH
(Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lesson-from-pﬁzer-dontdescribe-your-product-as-snake-oil-in-internal-email. In today’s climate of
sophisticated marketing strategies, prophylactic rules restricting oﬀ-label promotion in order to protect the public health may be more justiﬁable than ever.
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C LOSING STATEMENT
The Whole “Truthiness”
LARS N OAH
No government agency has jurisdiction over the truth.
The X-Files (1993)
Professor Greene makes a powerful argument in favor of strong federal
regulation over oﬀ-label drug claims, but her constitutional defense remains
terribly ﬂimsy. Notwithstanding Professor Greene’s suggestion to the
contrary, I harbor no illusions about the capacity of physicians or the ethics
of the pharmaceutical industry when it comes to marketing. See Lars Noah,
Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diﬀusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 A RIZ. L. R EV . 373, 391-95, 402-06, 430-49
(2002). Unlike her, however, I do not regard the First Amendment as
merely an afterthought or a bothersome obstacle to skirt. Again Professor
Greene expresses concerns about making government enforcement more
diﬃcult, but isn’t that precisely the point of the Constitution? After
studying this Agency for the last quarter century, I do not share her evident
faith in the good sense of the FDA.
More remarkably, Professor Greene now suggests that oﬀ-label promotion may fail Central Hudson’s ﬁrst prong as “inherently misleading.” The
sole support oﬀered for this astonishing proposition: an article by a distinguished member of the House of Representatives. Promotional claims about
oﬀ-label (as well as on-label) uses of pharmaceutical products certainly have
the potential to mislead, and the government may impose restrictions to
guard against this possibility so long as it can satisfy the Court’s demanding
form of heightened scrutiny, but to call such claims inherently misleading—
and therefore completely unprotected by the First Amendment—boggles
the mind. See, e.g., Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(calling “almost frivolous” the FDA’s suggestion that health claims for
dietary supplements were inherently misleading); see also United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165 n.10 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The government does not
contend that oﬀ-label promotion is in and of itself false or misleading.”).
Professor Greene notes that, during the 1960s, Congress rejected the
option of disclaimers. Interestingly, in spite of legislative ﬁndings of
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promotional abuses in the ﬁeld, it also failed to give the FDA full authority
to regulate detailing. See Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent
Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales
Representatives?, 47 F OOD & D RUG L.J. 309, 312-15, 323-26 (1992). Twenty
years ago, by contrast, Congress endorsed the use of disclaimers (directed to
laypersons no less) in tandem with typically unfounded promotional claims
that otherwise would convert dietary supplements into unapproved new
drugs. See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-417, § �, ��� Stat. ����, ���� (codiﬁed at �� U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C)
(2012)). From a public policy standpoint, that struck me as insane (talk
about “snake oil”!); from a constitutional perspective, however, it better
comports with the Supreme Court’s increasingly unforgiving application of
the Central Hudson test.
Finally, let us not forget that the Court in Western States showed remarkable indiﬀerence to the considered choices that Congress had made about
pharmacy compounding of genuinely unapproved drugs just ﬁve years
earlier. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360-65 (2002)
(describing the practice of preparing customized drugs for patients with
special needs and the problem of pharmacists manufacturing drugs under
the guise of compounding, and explaining that, in ����, Congress codiﬁed
certain portions of an FDA policy granting a limited exception to new drug
approval requirements for pharmacists who provide such compounding
services); id. at 371-73 (holding that the prohibition on advertising the
availability of particular compounded drugs failed the ﬁnal prong of the
Central Hudson test because, for instance, several other conditions included
by Congress in the new provision might have suﬃced to protect the
government’s interests). Why on earth would the Court care about legislative judgments dating back more than half a century, especially insofar as
Congress did not want physicians to hear certain things about drugs that
had already undergone FDA approval (and why does she keep harping on
the hazards of unapproved drugs when the issue before us concerns unapproved new uses for approved drugs)?
Professor Greene dismisses my hypothetical as atypical, but I never suggested that this represents the only application of the FDA’s rules that
would violate the First Amendment—instead, it clearly demonstrates the
overbroad operation of the Agency’s policies. Meanwhile, her continued
preoccupation with false and misleading instances of oﬀ-label promotion
clouds the issue. If oﬀ-label uses have such little merit, then the government should—as it has done in limited cases—just ban the practice altogether (except perhaps for certain specialties such as oncology). See, e.g., 21
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U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2012) (prohibiting the distribution of human growth
hormone for oﬀ-label use); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical
Health Servs. v. Abbott, No. 13-51008, 2014 WL 1257965, at *14-17 (5th Cir.
Mar. ��, ����) (rejecting diﬀerent constitutional objections to a Texas
prohibition on oﬀ-label prescribing of the FDA-approved abortifacient
mifepristone); see also Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in
Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. K AN . L. R EV . 149, 179, 188-93
(����). Although it surely would oﬀend the American Medical Association,
which makes the idea politically unrealistic, such a conduct-focused solution
to this supposedly intractable problem would not oﬀend the Constitution,
and then Central Hudson’s ﬁrst prong plainly would allow a ban on any
aﬃliated advertising.
Another application of the FDA’s rule against promoting oﬀ-label drug
uses makes its constitutional inﬁrmity even clearer, and this one represents
a twist that not a single court or commentator has ever confronted—no
doubt because, in practice, the situation would rarely arise. To extend my
previous hypothetical, let us assume that Pharmerica ﬁnally gets its SNDA
for Ridaclot, which allows the company to add Alzheimer’s patients to the
indications in the package insert and then relatively freely engage in
advertising of this new use. At the same time, Prescott Pharmaceuticals
(best known for sponsoring the recurring “Cheating Death” segment on The
Colbert Report), secures an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), see 21
U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012), for its generic version of Ridaclot. The labeling for
the generic must mimic the brand-name in almost all respects. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (2013); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471,
2476 (2013); see also Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985,
67,988-89 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (proposing to loosen this requirement
by allowing ANDA-holders to strengthen risk information unilaterally).
When the brand-name manufacturer gets agency approval for a new use,
it generally secures three additional years of market exclusivity on just that
use, which means that the FDA cannot approve an ANDA for that use until
this period expires. Generic versions of the drug initially can only list the
uses appearing in the originally approved labeling. See Lars Noah, This Is
Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 B ROOK . L. R EV . 839, 910 &
n.310 (2009). As a result, Prescott’s generic drug only indicates use as an
anticoagulant, which means that the company also cannot advertise it as a
safe and eﬀective treatment for Alzheimer’s disease even though the FDA
has approved precisely such a statement for Ridaclot. After waiting for the
three-year exclusivity period (and any method-of-use patents, in case they
run longer) to expire, and without having to submit any further evidence to
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the Agency, Prescott will get permission to add this indication to the
labeling for its generic drug and then relatively freely engage in advertising
for this not-so-new use.
What accounts for initially granting the brand-name company a monopoly over this new information that the FDA has anointed as truthful and
nonmisleading? Whatever the explanation, does that justify making it a
federal oﬀense for a competitor to disseminate this very same information?
In no sense does this prohibition help to guard against the making of false
or misleading claims. If agency approval of an SNDA allowed a previously
approved generic competitor to revise the labeling for its drug immediately,
then brand-name manufacturers would, of course, have even less of an
already weak incentive to seek FDA approval of new uses. The pursuit of
such collateral purposes would not, however, stand much of a chance under
the heightened scrutiny of Western States.
Instead of granting three years of partial exclusivity, Congress could
amend the FDCA to grant the NDA-holder two more years of full exclusivity with the ﬁrst added use (and perhaps another year with a second added
use). This would have the dual beneﬁt of improving the incentive for ﬁling
SNDAs—without having to bar oﬀ-label promotion—and ensuring that
generic drug manufacturers do not encounter the prohibition on making oﬀlabel claims once the FDA approves their ANDAs. Congress crafted the
six-month added exclusivity incentive for testing oﬀ-label uses in pediatric
patients in roughly this manner. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)–(c) (2012); see also
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Jennifer S.
Li et al., Economic Return of Clinical Trials Performed Under the Pediatric
Exclusivity Program, 297 JAMA 480 (2007). Delaying generic entry might
seem like a steep price for patients and their insurers to pay, but the First
Amendment casts serious doubt on the preferred current approach of
casually trading away the speech rights of regulated entities and saving
prosecutors the hassle of trying to separate the wheat from the chaﬀ.
Why has this aspect of the problem gone entirely unnoticed? At present,
generic drug manufacturers have little reason to advertise. As with expenditures for research and development, they free-ride on the marketing eﬀorts
of brand-name manufacturers, counting on dramatically lower prices
coupled with generic substitution policies to gain market share. See Lars
Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor’s
Copycat Product, 45 T ORT T RIAL & INS. P RAC . L.J. 673, 678-79, 684 &
n.53 (2010); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (barring a
state eﬀort to hamstring brand-name drug manufacturers in order to favor
its message of encouraging the use of cheaper generic drugs). Nonetheless,
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if that business model changed for some reason, then generic sellers would
confront an absolute barrier to communicating any information about new
FDA-approved uses during the brand-name manufacturer’s period of market
exclusivity. For present purposes, this scenario has powerful explanatory value
in highlighting the constitutional ﬂaws of the Agency’s policies, and it suﬀers
from none of Professor Greene’s concerns about ease of veriﬁcation.
In a related vein, the FDA’s ﬂat prohibition on oﬀ-label promotion enables still other parties to interfere with the commercial speech rights of drug
manufacturers. Although courts have declined to recognize any private right
of action for violations of the FDCA, infractions may provide the basis for
seeking penalties under collateral statutes or common law. This means that,
even if the Agency exercised its largely unreviewable enforcement discretion to look the other way so long as companies made sure to avoid false or
misleading claims about uses that it had not approved, the opportunity for
other public and private actors to make use of this bright line rule gives it a
zero-tolerance quality. (The nonﬁnal and nonbinding guidance documents
allowing limited forms of indirect promotion represent an unreliable
expression of the FDA’s enforcement policy and in no way amend the
Agency’s sweeping regulations.) In contrast, if those plaintiﬀs had to
demonstrate that a drug advertisement violated the far more ambiguous
FDA rules against making false or misleading claims, then they would ﬁnd
it tougher sledding absent a prior ﬁnding by the Agency of such a violation.
See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the
Government Standards Defense, 37 W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 903, 954-56 &
nn.212-13 (1996).
For instance, under the False Claims Act, whistleblowers have repeatedly
pointed to oﬀ-label promotion as a basis for triggering prosecution even
where the FDA later approved some of these uses. See Sandra H. Johnson,
Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims
Regarding Oﬀ-Label Prescribing, 9 M INN . J. L. S CI. & T ECH . 61, 104, 110
(2008); Natasha Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry on Oﬀ-Label Use, N.Y.
T IMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at A1 (reporting several recent settlements totaling
almost $5 billion). Public and private parties also have pursued claims under
state consumer protection statutes when pharmaceutical manufacturers cross
the clear line created by the Agency’s rules. See, e.g., In re Epogen &
Aranesp Oﬀ-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1282,
1289 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Prohias v. Pﬁzer, Inc., ��� F. Supp. �d ��28,
1234-35 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (declining to dismiss claims against the manufacturer of Lipitor® for advertisements that implied the cholesterol-lowering
drug’s usefulness in reducing the risk of heart disease before the FDA had
approved such additional indications). Plaintiﬀs in these consumer fraud
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cases sometimes also include (though generally without success so far)
claims under the federal Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act. See, e.g., Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm.,
LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1356 & n.5, 1366-�� (��th Cir. ����) (oﬀ-label marketing
of antipsychotic Seroquel®); see also J. Gordon Cooney, Jr. et al., Back to the
Future: Civil RICO in Oﬀ-Label Promotion Litigation, 77 D EF. C OUNS. J. 168
(2010). Finally, in tort litigation, plaintiﬀs have secured sizeable recoveries,
including multi-million dollar punitive damages awards, by pointing to
violations of the Agency’s prohibition on oﬀ-label claims. See, e.g., Proctor
v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1212-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Wyeth v. Rowatt,
244 P.3d 765, 772, 783-86 (Nev. 2010); see also Andrew E. Costa, Negligence
Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical Device Litigation, 57 M E . L.
R EV . 51, 75-76 & n.186 (2005).
Lastly, Professor Greene points out that the FDA’s revised draft guidance document would have allowed Pharmerica to distribute reprints of the
peer-reviewed article describing Ridaclot’s utility in Alzheimer’s patients. I
had conceded as much previously, but in practice manufacturers have not
trusted this purported “safe harbor,” both because of its many cumbersome
conditions and because the Agency has disclaimed giving it binding eﬀect.
See Notice, Agency Information Collection Activities; Dissemination of
Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and
Devices, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,708, 56,709 (Sept. 28, 2005) (estimating that the
Agency would receive fewer than a dozen ﬁlings a year under a previous
version of this exception). Also, no matter the caliber of the published
research or the care in not overstating the results, the company deﬁnitely
could not arrange for printed advertisements in prominent medical journals
to announce this study.
Even if, after purchasing a pile of reprints, Pharmerica aﬃxed the disclaimers and additional information demanded by the Guidance (satisfying
Professor Greene’s understanding of the First Amendment as entitling the
government to demand “the whole truth”), nothing would prevent the FDA
from charging the company with a violation of its regulations banning oﬀlabel promotion, and, of course, any deviation from the Guidance would
invite such a reaction. Moreover, the Agency could invoke its broadly
construed authority over “labeling,” and, in addition to pursuing sanctions
against the manufacturer and its products, the FDA could initiate a “seizure” action (a form of pretrial detention) against the reprints themselves.
If the government prevailed on the misbranding charges at trial, then the
federal court would issue a “condemnation” order entitling the government
to destroy the reprints. See, e.g., United States v. Articles of Drug, 32
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F.R.D. 32, 34-35 (S.D. Ill. 1963). All this for failing to pay the price—in
time, eﬀort, and money—needed to secure FDA permission to share
potentially valuable new therapeutic information with physicians about a
previously approved drug.
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